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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S COMPREHENSIVE REASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report was called for by the Security Council in its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993. That resolution included the following:

> "7. Decides to conduct a comprehensive reassessment of UNFICYP at the time of the consideration of the Force's mandate in December 1993, including of the implications of progress on confidence-building measures and towards a political settlement for the future of the Force;
>
> "8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report one month before that reassessment, to cover all aspects of the situation, including confidence-building measures, progress in political negotiations and possible progressive steps towards an observer force based on the proposal described in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report (S/25492 of 30 March 1993)."

2. In paragraphs 20 and 21 of my report of 14 September 1993 (S/26438), concerning my mission of good offices in Cyprus, I, inter alia, described how I would proceed in the subsequent months with regard to the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package of confidence-building measures, including through the dispatch to the island of two teams of experts. I went on to state the following:

> "I shall convey the outcome of my efforts during the coming two months, including the results of both teams' work to the Security Council in the report which the Council, in its resolution of 27 May 1993, requested me to submit by mid-November" (para. 22).

By a letter dated 20 September 1993 (S/26475), the President of the Security Council informed me that the Council members had endorsed fully the above-mentioned report.

3. The Security Council will also recall that the General Assembly, in its resolution 47/236 of 14 September 1993, reaffirmed the role of the Assembly, as set out in Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations, as the organ to consider and approve the budget of the Organization, as well as the

apportionment of its expenses among Member States. The same resolution endorsed the observations and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of 26 August 1993 (A/47/1004). It raised a number of questions concerning the budget and administration of the Force and included the following paragraph:

> "The Committee notes that in its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, the Security Council decided to conduct a comprehensive reassessment of UNFICYP at the time of the consideration of the Force's mandate in December 1993. The Committee requests the Secretary-General, following that reassessment, to report to the General Assembly on the administrative and financial aspects of such decisions as the Security Council may take" (para. 10).

I will, therefore, report to the General Assembly when the Security Council has completed its comprehensive reassessment of the Force.

4. Consistent with Security Council resolution 831 (1993), the regular six-monthly report in connection with the Security Council's renewal of the mandate of the United Nations operation in Cyprus has been incorporated into the present report. While the current mandate expires on 15 December 1993, the statistics cited as current in the present report are valid as of mid-November 1993.

5. The present report is divided into the following three parts:

(a) Part I. Overview of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, describing the functions of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) as mandated by the Security Council; the strength, organization and deployment of the Force; the Secretary-General's good offices mission in Cyprus; and the cost and financing of the United Nations operation in Cyprus;

(b) Part II. Detailed operations during the current mandate period (16 June-15 December 1993), including the maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo; restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions; and the Committee on Missing Persons;

(c) Part III. Observations.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

A. Mandate and functions of the Force

6. The mandate of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 as follows:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993. Following the events of 15 July 1974 and

thereafter, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. 1/

7. The functions of UNFICYP in pursuance of its mandate are twofold:

(a) Maintenance of the military status quo and prevention of a recurrence of fighting;

(b) Humanitarian and economic activities to promote a return to normal conditions.

1. Maintenance of the military status quo

8. Since August 1974, UNFICYP has been deployed between the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. This area, known as the buffer zone, extends across the island for some 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos in the north-west to the Dherinia area in the south-east. The area between the two lines varies in width from 7 kilometres to only a few metres.

9. The functions of UNFICYP are based on the requirements of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in 1974. In keeping with these requirements, it is the position of the United Nations that the opposing forces should remain behind their respective cease-fire lines and that neither can exercise authority or jurisdiction beyond its own cease-fire line.

10. UNFICYP considers the main categories of cease-fire violations to be:

(a) Any move of military elements forward of their cease-fire line into the buffer zone;

(b) The discharge of any type of weapons or explosives, without prior notification, along the cease-fire lines or up to a distance of 1,000 metres behind them;

(c) Building of new or strengthening of existing military positions within 400 metres of the opposing cease-fire line;

(d) Building of new or strengthening of existing military positions more than 400 metres from the opposing cease-fire line if UNFICYP considers this incompatible with the spirit of the cease-fire;

(e) Overflights of the buffer zone by military or civilian aircraft, or flights by military aircraft, of either side, within 1,000 metres of the buffer zone;

(f) Troop deployment and training exercises in an area closer than 1,000 metres from their cease-fire line without prior notification;

(g) Provocative acts between the two sides, such as shouting abuse, indecent gestures or throwing stones.

11. Strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone and along both cease-fire lines is essential to prevent a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP seeks to maintain the status quo by monitoring of the cease-fire lines and the buffer zone and by swift reaction to any violation. To this end, UNFICYP maintains constant surveillance from 21 observation posts, daylight hours surveillance from 3 and periodic surveillance from 19. All these posts are used for overnight accommodation of UNFICYP military personnel. UNFICYP also maintains periodic surveillance from a further 108 observation points; carries out vehicle, foot and air patrols; maintains surveillance of the seaward extension of the cease-fire lines; investigates and acts upon violations of the cease-fire and ensures that the status quo is restored; defuses cases of tension, especially through the prompt deployment of troops; and maintains constant liaison and communications with all command levels of the military forces on both sides. UNFICYP also monitors the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha and in the village of Strovilia, which is a tiny Greek Cypriot community isolated from the area to the south of the buffer zone by the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.

12. There is no formal agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides on the complete delineation of the buffer zone as recorded by UNFICYP, nor on the use and control of the buffer zone. As a result, UNFICYP finds itself supervising, by loose mutual consent, two constantly disputed cease-fire lines. The parties each continue to this day in their attempts to advance their cease-fire line through persistent movements forward and encroachments into the buffer zone. In the prevailing climate of distrust, even minor moves on one side may be interpreted as a provocation and prompt a reaction by the other. UNFICYP troops deployed along the buffer zone have to be fully familiar with every detail of the existing arrangements, maintain constant observation and be prepared to react should any step be taken that could be construed as a violation of the military status quo.

13. UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year (791 during the first nine months of 1993). When violations are observed, they are immediately dealt with at the local level. UNFICYP's reaction depends on the nature of the violation and may include investigation, the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been corrected or will not recur. An essential element in preventing serious escalations of incidents is to maintain constant liaison at all levels with the forces on both sides.

14. UNFICYP's task is most complicated where the cease-fire lines are close to each other, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. Tense situations often occur where the buffer zone is only a few metres wide and opposing forces confront each other across a narrow UNFICYP patrol track. Soldiers on both sides have been prone to deliberate acts of provocation, including shouting abuse, weapon cocking, throwing stones and making obscene gestures. This invites retaliation in kind and can easily escalate if UNFICYP does not interpose itself quickly to calm tensions and maintain a physical presence until tempers have cooled. In past years such incidents, as well as other instances of lack of discipline, have resulted in fatalities from shootings.

15. UNFICYP has for a number of years attempted to persuade the two sides to pull their troops further back in areas where they are only metres apart. In May 1989, UNFICYP succeeded in concluding an unmanning agreement with the two sides, whereby they agreed to withdraw their forces from selected positions in Nicosia (S/20663, para. 14). Security Council resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992 urged that the military authorities on each side cooperate with UNFICYP to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity. UNFICYP's efforts in this connection have not been fruitful. This proposal has also been included in the package of confidence-building measures, which the Security Council has urged all concerned to implement.

16. In addition to maintaining the military status quo, UNFICYP must also preserve the integrity of the buffer zone from unauthorized entry or activities by civilians. As a result, UNFICYP has from time to time become involved in crowd control. Civilian demonstrations near the cease-fire line on the Greek Cypriot side have often degenerated into individual or mass attempts to enter the buffer zone with the declared purpose of crossing to the other side. Sometimes, such demonstrations have been accompanied by considerable violence on the part of demonstrators, including attacks on UNFICYP personnel and property. While the primary responsibility for preventing demonstrators from crossing the cease-fire line rests with the civilian police authorities concerned, experience has shown that UNFICYP troops and United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) must be deployed in considerable numbers to prevent demonstrators from entering the buffer zone. In addition, each year UNCIVPOL investigates hundreds of other incidents (249 during the first nine months of 1993) occurring in the buffer zone, such as unauthorized entry by civilians, traffic accidents, fires, thefts, shootings, hunting with firearms, rubbish dumping and other unauthorized activities.

2. Economic and humanitarian activities

17. The second function entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council is to promote a return to normal conditions. Towards this end it carries out a number of economic and humanitarian activities. The economic activities are largely related to agriculture and industry inside the buffer zone and to public utilities that cross the buffer zone. The humanitarian activities are largely concerned with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living among the other community.

18. The buffer zone covers about 3 per cent of the island and includes some of the most valuable agricultural land. With a view to promoting the restoration of normal conditions, UNFICYP encourages and facilitates farming and other economic activities in the buffer zone. Farming and other economic activities are allowed, provided that ownership can be proven and that the activities present no security threat to either side or to UNFICYP. Farming permits are issued to proven owners of land, the great majority of whom are Greek Cypriots. As a result of active UNFICYP policy, farming has been extended almost to the limit of available land. UNFICYP has drawn up farming security lines to limit farming by individuals of one community to land that is at least 400 metres from the cease-fire line of the other side. UNFICYP keeps the farming area under constant supervision from observation posts or through patrols. There are also

in the buffer zone a number of industries, mines and quarries that have been reactivated through UNFICYP's support and frequent patrolling.

19. Another important function of UNFICYP concerns public utilities, particularly in the sensitive sectors of water and electricity. Electric power in the northern part of the island continues to be supplied by the southern part, although a large generating station located in the north is at an advanced stage of construction. Water sources originating on one side or the other flow across the cease-fire lines and sometimes back, criss-crossing the buffer zone. Therefore, UNFICYP has a major responsibility in patrolling the lines and pipes, in helping to maintain them and in resolving disputes over the allocation of water or electricity as well as in providing liaison between the relevant authorities on the two sides.

20. UNFICYP military and UNCIVPOL patrols and escorts also perform and support public health and safety work in the buffer zone by activities such as malaria control, prevention of illicit garbage and sewage disposal, fire fighting and issuing burning permits.

21. UNFICYP discharges important functions with regard to the welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island and undertakes regular visits to Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part. UNFICYP also provides support to the relief operations coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and discharges certain functions handed over by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus in June 1977. 2/

22. UNFICYP's principal activities in the performance of its humanitarian functions can be numerous. From June 1992-May 1993, 7 persons were transferred permanently and 1,329 temporarily across the buffer zone at Nicosia; 64 meetings of divided families were arranged at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone at Nicosia; weekly deliveries of food, medicines, clothing and fuel to Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island were made; transportation for patients in the northern part to hospitals in the southern part was arranged 231 times; and 24 visits to prisoners by family members living on the other side were arranged.

23. In recent years, the Secretary-General has referred in successive reports to the desirability of having the two sides cooperate more directly in the humanitarian field, instead of relying on UNFICYP to serve as go-between. Some modest progress has been registered with the establishment in July 1993 of an UNFICYP humanitarian exchange point at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. Money, pension cheques, medicines and requests for foreign visas are exchanged directly there by the two sides, bringing to an end UNFICYP's former practice of delivering such items across the buffer zone. This positive development has both reduced the demands on UNFICYP during a period of manpower constraints and improved intercommunal communications.

24. From the foregoing, it is clear that the mandate given to UNFICYP by the Security Council has remained the same since the last comprehensive review of UNFICYP was undertaken in November 1990, as essentially have the functions of the Force deriving from that mandate.

B. Strength, organization and deployment of the Force

1. Strength and organization

25. The operational elements of UNFICYP comprise a headquarters, a Military Police company, an aviation flight capacity and three battalions, each responsible for a sector of the buffer zone. The three battalions, deployed from west to east, are contributed by Argentina, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Austria. This deployment is shown on the accompanying map. A military camp command unit is expected to be deployed by January 1994 to give the necessary military and administrative support to the United Nations protected area where UNFICYP headquarters is located. In addition, a United Nations international civilian staff is responsible for various functions at UNFICYP headquarters and, following the departure of the United Kingdom Support Regiment, for Force-wide support functions. Finally, locally employed personnel work at UNFICYP headquarters, sector headquarters and company camps.

26. The table below shows UNFICYP's strength on 15 November 1993:

Military personnel

Argentina	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion	364	
	Military police element	6	375
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	336	
	Military observers	4	
	Military police element	8	354
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	6	6
Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	1	1
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	1	1
Hungary	Military observers	4	4
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military observers	4	
	Military police element	2	12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	9	
	Army aviation flight	19	
	Military police element	4	
	Infantry battalion	377	
	Supply detachment	6	415
	Total military		1 168

Civilian Police personnel	
Australia	20
Ireland	15
Total Civilian Police a/	35
Total UNFICYP	1 203

a/ Two CIVPOL to be employed in UNFICYP headquarters.

This strength of 1,203 is 120 less than the recently authorized strength for UNFICYP of 1,323. 3/ The shortfall is composed of personnel for an armoured car squadron that has yet to be formed, 19 members of the Camp Command Unit, which will replace elements of the former Support Regiment, 4 Canadian military policemen due to arrive in January 1994 and a reduction of 3 civilian police posts. The current total of 1,203 compares with 2,132 at the end of 1990 and with 2,078 at the end of November 1992.

27. UNFICYP deploys its on-line force in observation posts and mobile foot and vehicle patrols between observation posts, particularly where the posts are not in view of each other. The Force Reserve of 55 personnel is drawn from the 3 line units and is permanently based in the United Nations protected area. It will have six Mowag armoured personnel carriers (APCs), provided by Argentina. The Argentinian and Austrian battalions provide two further platoons each, one ready to move at two hours notice and one at six hours notice. The British battalion provides one platoon only, ready to move at 2 hours notice. In terms of mobility and readiness, this does not compare favourably with the Force Reserve available in December 1990. That consisted of the armoured Ferret Scout Car Squadron of over 100 men and 5 platoons each ready to move at 2 hours notice. The two UNCIVPOL contingents provide support to all the three sectors.

28. These forces are underpinned by support elements within each contingent and by the civilian administration that has assumed responsibility for second-line support for the Force following withdrawal of the United Kingdom Support Regiment. The logistic support for the Force consists of a Logistic and Personnel Branch at headquarters with nine military personnel who, in conjunction with the civilian administration, are responsible for coordinating and consolidating Force-wide requirements for goods, services and equipment. The civilianized support establishment has replaced the following elements of the former Support Regiment: engineer detachment, signals squadron, transport squadron, electrical and mechanical workshops and the Officers' Mess. Those elements that serviced UNFICYP Headquarters will be reformed as a Camp Command.

29. The long-standing cost-sharing arrangements between the United Nations and the United Kingdom have come to an end. The volume of logistic support available through the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas in accordance with the previous United Kingdom/United Nations memorandum of understanding, has been scaled down. These developments have resulted in a considerable increase in the

civilian administration's procurement workload and the Mission is now introducing the United Nations standardized procurement software package to streamline procedures and minimize the number of additional staff required. Of particular concern is the maintenance of the patrol track in the buffer zone, the upkeep and the Force, the resupply of observation posts and the safety of the troops using the track, formerly carried out by the British Royal Engineers. Alternative methods of maintaining the track are being considered.

30. The Force Commander is assisted, as is usual in peace-keeping operations, by a senior adviser and a spokesman, who advise him respectively on policies and actions of a political nature relating to the responsibilities of the Force and on questions concerning relations with the press. Since the discontinuation of the post of military press and information officer, the spokesman serves as the sole focus for the Force's contact with the media and also performs working-level political tasks formerly carried out by the holder of a post of political affairs officer, which was discontinued. The services of both the senior adviser and the spokesman are shared with the Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative, who leads in Cyprus the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.

2. Consequences of the reduction in the Force's strength

31. In the past 12 months, the Force has undergone dramatic reductions in strength. Its structure and deployment have similarly undergone important changes, as has the composition of its national contingents.

32. In my report of 30 March 1993 (S/25492), I recalled that my predecessor and I had predicted that, unless the Security Council took the decision to convert the financing of UNFICYP to the system that had been standard for all peace-keeping operations established since 1973, the financial burden that troop-contributing countries were being asked to bear would eventually lead to the collapse of the Force. The past six-month period had seen the withdrawal of the full Danish battalion, 198 United Kingdom personnel, 63 from Austria and 61 from Canada. UNFICYP's strength had fallen from 2,141 in May 1992 to 1,508 in March 1993. These reductions had, in the view of the Force Commander, compromised the ability of UNFICYP to carry out its mandate. I had, none the less, instructed him to absorb as best he could their effects and to use his best endeavours to maintain effective control of the buffer zone and carry out UNFICYP's humanitarian functions.

33. There was the prospect of further withdrawals: (a) by mid-1993 the entire Canadian battalion (which would require that the two remaining battalions from Austria and the United Kingdom be reorganized in two sectors); (b) by the end of 1993, 176 personnel of the United Kingdom Support Regiment; (c) the 18 personnel of the Swedish Civilian Police; and (d) the reduction of the Finnish Contingent from 7 personnel to 1. The Council was advised that, unless the situation was redressed, UNFICYP would cease to be viable.

34. In these circumstances, I underlined the need for UNFICYP to retain three line sectors/battalions if the Force was to have the capacity to carry out its mandate. I also shared the Force Commander's assessment that UNFICYP needed the capability of an armoured unit in situations of tension to show force when

required and to be able to use an armoured reserve for reconnaissance, crowd control or personnel rescue.

35. There was, however, no hope of attracting a new major troop contributor to the Force unless the system of voluntary financing of UNFICYP was changed to a more equitable arrangement and the Council accepted funding on the basis of assessed contributions. I stressed to the Council that the real question before it was whether to take the necessary decision with regard to the financing of the Force or to allow UNFICYP to dissolve into a token presence.

36. In mid-June 1993, the Canadian battalion withdrew as scheduled. Consequently, the strength of the Force dipped temporarily to approximately 1,000. The Force Commander implemented an emergency contingency plan, reorganizing the Force temporarily into two sectors, covered by the Austrian and United Kingdom battalions. However, this did not last long. By its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, the Security Council supported a system of financing the Force on the basis of a mixture of assessed and firmly pledged voluntary contributions. I welcomed that decision, which was followed by an offer by the Government of Argentina of a line battalion. The Force deployment was thus restored, as of 8 October 1993, to three line sectors/battalions, i.e., the restructured deployment recommended in my report of 30 March 1993 and endorsed in Security Council resolution 831 (1993). With the arrival of 12 military observers, the Force's overall strength has stabilized at 1,203.

37. While the three-sector structure of UNFICYP has been maintained, the strength of the Force has been reduced by 929 personnel, or 43.6 per cent, since December 1990. There has been a similar decline in the number of personnel making up the line battalions.

Number of military personnel making up line battalions

Dec. 1990	Nov. 1993	Actual decline	% decline
1 569	1 077	492	31.4

As a consequence, the number of observation posts from which 24-hour observation is conducted has fallen in the same period from 52 to 21. The departure of the United Kingdom's Ferret Scout Car Squadron of 28 armoured reconnaissance vehicles has been only partially mitigated by the recent deployment of 9 Argentinian APCs. The capacity of the Force to carry out its mandated functions has therefore diminished.

38. To offset this situation, the Force Commander has taken a number of steps. Firstly, he has reorganized the Force so that the "teeth to tail" ratio or line/support ratio has improved. In December 1990 the line battalions comprised 73.5 per cent of the strength of the Force; the comparable figure now is 89.5 per cent. Secondly, he has deployed more of the manpower available in the battalions onto the line. A greater proportion of personnel live there than in the past. Thus, while many observation posts no longer have 24-hour observation, a good number of these have become places of accommodation where there is always an UNFICYP presence. Thirdly, there is a greater reliance than

before on mobile patrolling between fixed observation posts. Fourthly, even though only a small number of the Force's personnel had been previously employed in humanitarian tasks, the number of hours involved has been reduced considerably, especially through the establishment of the humanitarian exchange point at the Ledra Palace Hotel.

C. The Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus

1. Mandate and organization of the mission of good offices

39. Good offices functions of the Secretary-General have been carried out in respect of Cyprus since 1964. Since 1966, the Secretary-General's special representatives have been engaged in promoting an agreed overall settlement. After the events of 1974, the Security Council, in its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices "and to that end to convene the parties under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated". Since then, the Secretary-General has, in connection with the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP, reaffirmed the new mission of good offices referred to in resolution 367 (1975).

40. Also since that time and particularly in the past three years, the Security Council has given detailed guidelines to the Secretary-General on the implementation of his mission of good offices. I refer specifically to resolutions 649 (1990), 716 (1991), 750 (1992), 774 (1992) and 789 (1992) as well as the numerous presidential statements and letters issued during the same period.

41. In the past two years, there has been an intensification of efforts to achieve an overall settlement. The process has yielded a "set of ideas" for an overall framework agreement, endorsed by the Security Council as the basis for reaching a settlement but not yet accepted by both sides and an important package of confidence-building measures, which also has won the support of the Council, but has not yet received the backing of both sides. During this period, the Council has repeatedly declared the status quo on the island to be unacceptable. It has also insisted on a positive approach by both sides and has, therefore, requested the Secretary-General to accelerate and intensify the negotiating process.

42. From 1964 to 1993 the Secretary-General has been represented in Cyprus by a resident Special Representative or Acting Special Representative. In support of the intensified effort demanded by the Security Council, I decided earlier this year to appoint a senior international political figure to serve as my Special Representative for Cyprus, but on a non-resident basis. On 21 May 1993, I appointed Mr. Joe Clark, the former Prime Minister of Canada, as my Special Representative. In a letter of 24 May 1993 (S/25833), the President of the Security Council stated that the Council welcomed that decision. In order to ensure a capacity for continuous contact and negotiation at the highest levels with the two sides on the island and a source of advice to me and to the Special

Representative in respect of significant developments concerning the good offices mission, I appointed Mr. Gustave Feissel as Deputy Special Representative, resident in Cyprus at the level of Assistant Secretary-General. The Deputy Special Representative is the only United Nations official in the field engaged full-time in the mission of good offices.

2. Recent developments in the mission of good offices

43. Soon after I assumed the office of Secretary-General I contacted the leaders of the two communities. There followed intensive and lengthy meetings at Headquarters during 1992. On 15 July 1992, I presented to each of the two leaders the text of the set of ideas for an overall framework agreement, including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in a map. The set of ideas had evolved on the basis of discussions with the two sides and with Turkey over the preceding two years. Regrettably, the extensive meetings of 1992 were not successful, as I reported in full to the Council (S/24830). In its resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, the Council, inter alia, called upon the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions consistent with the set of ideas.

44. Also in my report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830) I remarked upon the deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. I suggested that the prospects for progress could be greatly enhanced if a number of confidence-building measures were adopted by the two sides. The purpose of such measures, taken in good faith by both sides, would be to facilitate accord on an overall framework agreement on the basis of the entire set of ideas endorsed earlier by the Security Council. The Security Council in its resolution 789 (1992) endorsed that approach. Both sides, as well as Greece and Turkey, welcomed this emphasis on confidence-building.

45. Following intensive preparatory work in Nicosia in April/May 1993 by my Deputy Special Representative, direct meetings with the two leaders were held in late May 1993 at United Nations Headquarters under my auspices and with the participation of the recently appointed Special Representative, Mr. Clark. Discussion in these meetings focused on a package of confidence-building measures, including, in particular, provisions for (a) the reopening, under United Nations administration, of the fenced area of Varosha as a centre for bicommunal contact and trade and (b) the reopening of Nicosia International Airport, under United Nations administration in cooperation with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), for unhindered traffic in passengers and cargo to and from each side. Once again, progress was not forthcoming, as discussed in my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026). In a letter dated 7 July 1993 (S/26050), the President of the Security Council wrote that the Council shared my assessment that the implementation of the package would not only significantly benefit both communities but would also have a dramatic impact in overcoming mistrust and in facilitating an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. They called on both parties to cooperate fully without further delay in reaching a prompt agreement on the package. Again, on 14 September, after my Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative had visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, I reported to the Council that progress on the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package of confidence-building measures had not yet been achieved, despite the fact that the package held real and proportionate benefits for both sides. In a letter dated 20 September 1993

(S/26475), the President of the Security Council stated, inter alia, that the Council had noted with concern that the Turkish Cypriot side had not yet shown the necessary goodwill and cooperation required to achieve an agreement. The Council members agreed that I could not continue my effort indefinitely; they called on the Turkish Cypriot side to give its active support to the effort; they recognized also the important role that Turkey could play in this effort; and they supported my proposals to send two technical teams to Cyprus to analyse the implications of the package.

46. A team of international economic experts was organized with the assistance of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) comprising six experts with extensive experience related to macro- and microeconomic issues, including development policies, fiscal and financial matters, industrial development, free trade zones, tourism planning, development marketing and civil aviation development. Their mandate was to examine the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package of confidence-building measures so that its benefits to both communities would be fully understood, and to consider ways of ensuring the effective implementation of the proposals set out in the package. During its field work in Cyprus from 14 October to 11 November, the team held extensive discussions with a wide range of political, business, trade union, academic and other interests on both sides and was well received by all.

47. A second team of experts, composed of four civil aviation experts and assembled with the assistance of UNDP and ICAO was mandated to examine the current condition of Nicosia International Airport and to identify all requirements for making it operational. The team began three weeks of field work in Cyprus on 31 October.

48. I have been advised by the team of international economic experts that their field work in Cyprus has confirmed that the package holds significant and proportionate benefits for both sides. I expect to receive the full reports of the two teams by the middle of December. The results of the teams' work will then be discussed with all concerned and will be made public so that the ramifications and benefits of the package will be fully understood. If there is a willingness on both sides to move forward with this mutually beneficial package, the work of the teams ought to facilitate early agreement on it. The danger, however, is that the necessary political will to move forward will not be forthcoming.

49. It is difficult to envisage forward movement before the elections to be held by the Turkish Cypriot side on 12 December 1993. The Government of Turkey has stated at the highest level, both in private and in public, that there should be speedy developments in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem once those elections have taken place and has also repeatedly stated at the highest level its support for the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package of confidence-building measures. Once the elections in the Turkish Cypriot community have been completed, I shall be in touch with the Governments of Turkey and Greece as well as with the two sides in Cyprus. It would be my intention to report to the Security Council in February 1994 on the outcome of those contacts.

D. Cost and financing of the Force

50. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 186 (1964), the Security Council recommended that the costs of UNFICYP should be met by the Governments providing contingents, by the Government of Cyprus in accordance with article 19 of the Status-of-Forces Agreement 4/ and by voluntary contributions to UNFICYP. Under agreements made prior to 15 June 1993, UNFICYP troop contributors individually agreed to absorb the costs that would be incurred by them if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel). However, the cost to the United Nations for maintaining UNFICYP included amounts to reimburse troop-contributing Governments (except the United Kingdom) for certain of the expenses they incurred by providing troops to the Force. The troop-contributing Governments sought reimbursement for these extra and extraordinary costs from the United Nations. The composition of the claims for extra and extraordinary costs differed among the troop-contributing Governments and included a variety of unstandardized costs.

51. From March 1964 until 15 June 1993, 79 countries, including a number which have contributed troops to the Force, have provided voluntary financial support to UNFICYP totalling some $490.2 million in cash contributions ($474.5 million) and pledges ($15.7 million) (see annex II).

52. For lack of sufficient voluntary contributions to UNFICYP, the latest reimbursement to the troop-contributing Governments for extra and extraordinary costs was made in June 1992 and covered claims for the six-month period ending December 1981. The consistent shortfalls in meeting the costs of UNFICYP resulted in the UNFICYP account being in arrears by over $200 million. Mindful of this situation, the General Assembly decided in its resolution 47/236 of 14 September 1993 that the costs of the Force for the period beginning 16 June 1993 not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations and also to maintain as separate the account established prior to 16 June 1993 for UNFICYP. The General Assembly invited Member States to make voluntary contributions to that account and requested that I intensify my efforts in appealing for voluntary contributions to the account. Therefore, on 12 November 1993, I addressed a special appeal to all States, urging them to contribute generously for this purpose.

53. On 15 April 1993 the Government of Cyprus in a letter to the Secretary-General (S/25647, annex) conveyed an offer to contribute, on a continuing basis, a voluntary contribution equal to one third of the annual cost of UNFICYP. In a subsequent letter dated 10 May 1993, the Government of Cyprus also indicated that its voluntary contribution for the 12-month period beginning 16 June 1993 would be increased to $18.5 million. This voluntary contribution was predicated on the restructuring of the Force in accordance with my preferred option of six line companies as described in paragraphs 16 to 19 of my report of 30 March 1993 (S/25492).

54. The voluntary contribution promised by the Government of Cyprus is in addition to and quite separate from that Government's obligations under article 19 of the Status-of-Forces Agreement whereby the Government of Cyprus has undertaken to provide without cost to the Force such areas for headquarters,

camps or other premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfilment of the functions of the Force.

55. On 7 May 1993, the Government of Greece, in a letter to the Secretary-General, indicated its intention to contribute voluntarily $6.5 million on an annual basis to the cost of the Force, provided that the Security Council decided to convert UNFICYP's system of financing to assessed contributions and that the structure and the strength of the Force, i.e. at least six companies, remained unchanged. The Government of Greece added that it might wish to reconsider the annual amount of $6.5 million, should the Security Council decide to change the structure and strength of the Force.

56. As a consequence of the foregoing, the costs of the Force have since 16 June 1993 been financed on a basis combining (a) voluntary contributions and (b) contributions assessed on the entire membership of the Organization. In adopting resolution 831 (1993) on 27 May 1993, the Security Council stressed the importance of the continuation of voluntary contributions to UNFICYP and called for maximum voluntary contributions in the future.

57. Taking into account the aforementioned undertakings given by the Governments of Cyprus and Greece, the General Assembly on 14 September 1993 appropriated $8,771,000 ($8,443,000 net) for the mandate period 16 June-15 December 1993. The operating costs of the Force for the current mandate period are, therefore, being met as follows:

	$
Voluntary contributions	12 500 000
Assessed contributions	8 771 000
Total	21 271 000

58. The introduction of a system of financing the Force that combines voluntary and assessed contributions has included for the first time in the UNFICYP budget such standard payments as troop reimbursement costs, welfare (recreational leave) and daily allowance for military contingents plus mission subsistence allowance, travel costs and clothing allowance in respect of military observers and civilian police. Existing agreements between the United Nations and Governments contributing troops to UNFICYP have been changed or are under review in order to conform to the new financing methodology of UNFICYP. Moreover, the costs of the United Kingdom Contingent, which heretofore had not been charged to the United Nations, now fall to the Organization. These additional costs, which were not previously a component of the UNFICYP budget, have contributed to an increase in the Force's operating costs for the current mandate period as compared to previous mandates, despite the reduction in the size of the Force. (See annex I for a comparison of costs from 1985 to 1993.) However, as a result of the new funding arrangements, a significant portion of these additional costs is absorbed by the voluntary contributions referred to above; the balance ($8,771,000) to be shared among all Member States is less than the operating costs for any 6-month period during the past 10 years.

II. DETAILED OPERATIONS DURING THE CURRENT MANDATE PERIOD

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the military status quo

59. In May 1992 I reported that UNFICYP had agreed to permit the National Guard to clear mines from an area of the buffer zone, on the understanding that the land would be designated for farming, and that, despite strong protests from UNFICYP, the National Guard had subsequently relaid the minefield (see S/24050). I also reported that the Government of Cyprus had agreed to remove the mines in question. During the period under review, the Government's commitment in this regard has still not been fulfilled.

60. During the period under review, the number of cease-fire violations again decreased in comparison with the previous reporting periods, and both sides showed considerable restraint and discipline. There continued to be isolated incidents where shots were thought to have been fired deliberately and, during the past six months, 16 separate incidents of weapons being cocked and pointed were reported. At the same time, the military forces on both sides continued to cooperate with all UNFICYP'S investigations, thereby ensuring that tension remained at a low level.

61. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia (see para 15. above) continued to hold, with only minor violations by both sides in the unmanned areas. I requested the Force Commander to continue discussions to extend the agreement to all areas of the buffer zone where the troops of both sides remain in close proximity to each other. However, no progress has been achieved. More recently, the extension of the unmanning agreement has been included in the package of confidence-building measures. I strongly urge both sides to cooperate fully in the effort to reduce tension by unmanning specific areas where their military forces are in close proximity.

62. During the period under review, there was a decrease in the number of violations by military aircraft, with 10 overflights of the buffer zone by Turkish Forces aircraft and 2 by National Guard aircraft. At the same time, there was a heavy increase in the number of air violations by other aircraft in the early part of the mandate period. Following a meeting in August 1993 with those responsible for aviation safety in the north, there have been only a few overflights of the buffer zone by civilian aircraft from the north. For the mandate period overall, there were 74 civilian overflights from the north, with 5 overflights from the south by the Cyprus Police Airwing. Civilian or military aircraft from other countries accounted for a further 13 overflights. These violations continue to create tension and increase the risk of serious incidents. All overflights were protested.

63. The National Guard's programme to improve its defensive positions all along its cease-fire line continued during this period and occasionally led to an increase in tension. The amount of construction was somewhat less than in previous reporting periods, and in some cases minor construction was stopped when protested by UNFICYP.

64. There were no incidents in the fenced area of Varosha. UNFICYP continued to monitor the area closely to ensure that the status quo was maintained. However, UNFICYP'S freedom of movement within the area continued to be

restricted. As stated in previous reports to the Security Council, the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha (see S/18880, para. 28), as reiterated to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities on numerous occasions. Despite this clear position on the part of the United Nations, the Government of Turkey has recently sought unilaterally to change long-standing procedures for access to the fenced area of Varosha for UNFICYP visitors. This is not acceptable, and I am certain that the Council will join me in calling on the Government of Turkey to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of long-standing procedures.

65. Despite UNFICYP'S continued representations, Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats continued to violate the seaward extensions of the cease-fire lines known as the maritime security lines, which were established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security and safety purposes in the vicinity of Kokkina and Famagusta. 5/ These violations raise tensions and are potentially dangerous for the individuals concerned. I therefore urge restraint by all parties and request that the authorities assist UNFICYP in supporting this measure.

66. As noted in my report of 9 June 1993 (S/25912, para. 20), threats to safety and security arose as a result of hunting by Greek Cypriots in certain areas of the buffer zone during the 1992 hunting season. Although the Government declared a ban on such hunting in 1992, armed and camouflaged poachers continued to enter the buffer zone causing UNFICYP to deploy additional military and police personnel to maintain the integrity of the buffer zone. I expect the Government to cooperate in the enforcement of the ban during the 1993 hunting season.

67. During the review period, several Greek Cypriot demonstrations and rallies took place. Although most demonstrations were peaceful, orderly and well-policed by the Cypriot police, this fact could not have been known in advance. In each case, UNFICYP deployed considerable manpower as a contingency. However, one demonstration, on 25 July, was marked by serious violence. A large number of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists circumvented UNFICYP-manned road blocks and entered the buffer zone at Akaki and Mammari approaching the Turkish Forces cease-fire line and prompting the Turkish Forces to overman their positions and to cock their weapons. The demonstrators then drove to Nicosia and confronted UNFICYP at the Ledra Crossing, where they were extremely belligerent, tore down the UNFICYP barriers by using vehicles equipped with towing chains and again entered the buffer zone. Six members of the Australian Civilian Police were injured. The motorcyclists finished at Dherinia where they again entered the buffer zone and approached the Turkish Forces cease-fire line. The demonstrators threw rocks and Molotov cocktails towards the Turkish Forces and towards the UNFICYP soldiers. Six members of the Austrian Contingent were injured and nine United Nations vehicles were damaged. Had these events not been met by a conscientious response on the part of UNFICYP and restraint by the Turkish Forces, there could have been serious consequences. Strong protests over this demonstration were made at the political and military levels. The Government expressed its regret and assured UNFICYP that it would take appropriate measures so that such incidents did not recur.

68. A further violent demonstration, attended by some 5,000 youths who had left their schools to participate, occurred at the Ledra Palace Hotel on 21 October 1993 at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

The buffer zone was violated and four members of the United Kingdom Contingent and one member of the Australian Civilian Police sustained injuries trying to restrain the demonstrators.

69. Another demonstration of some 2,000 participants at Astromeritis on 17 October 1993 was largely peaceful. Some demonstrators, however, penetrated the buffer zone and a number of these subsequently stated to UNFICYP that they had been incited to do so by some of the organizers of the event.

70. I share the view of the Force Commander that neither the Security Council nor the troop-contributing Governments should be expected to accept that violations of the buffer zone or attacks on UNFICYP personnel are not prevented by the Cyprus Police.

71. Each side again expressed its concern over the strength of the military forces on the other side. I also remain very concerned about the strength and development of the military forces on both sides. This creates tension and risks of serious incidents. As recommended in my report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830, para. 63), and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 789 (1992), the Turkish Forces on the island should be reduced to their 1982 level and this should be reciprocated by a suspension of weapons acquisition programmes on the Greek Cypriot side.

72. In its resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993, the Security Council mandated the Secretary-General to negotiate arrangements whereby the two sides would prohibit (a) along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those that are hand-held and (b) firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone. UNFICYP has taken up this operational matter with the military commanders on both sides, asking each of them to designate a senior officer to serve as point of contact with UNFICYP in this regard. Unfortunately, the response from the Commander of the Turkish Forces has been that resolution 839 (1993), like all other resolutions related to Cyprus and adopted by the United Nations Security Council, concerns "political matters". In the Turkish Forces Commander's view, it would be necessary for civilian authorities in the north and the Government of Cyprus both to agree on the terms of resolution 839 (1993) and on how it should be implemented. The Turkish Forces Commander declined, therefore, to pursue the matter further and instead directed UNFICYP to the authorities in the northern part of the island. UNFICYP has told the Turkish Forces that this position is not acceptable. The Commander of the National Guard, on the other hand, has nominated his Chief of Staff as UNFICYP's interlocutor in the matter.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

73. UNFICYP has for many years worked with authorities and agencies on both sides to facilitate a wide spectrum of humanitarian activities. It has sponsored bicommunal contacts and encouraged authorities to cooperate in restoring normal conditions for members of both communities. During the reporting period there has been some significant progress in persuading both sides, despite their initial reservations, to cooperate more closely in connection with essential humanitarian services and in promoting people-to-people contact. The UNFICYP exchange point was established in

July 1993 at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone. The activities conducted through the exchange point to date are:

(a) The provision of medicines to be transported from south to north;

(b) The transfer of mail in each direction;

(c) The transmission of Cyprus Government pension and welfare cheques to Turkish Cypriot recipients in the north and related processing;

(d) Emergency medical evacuations and hospital runs, north to south;

(e) Facilitation of the processing by embassies accredited to the Government of Cyprus of visa applications from applicants in the north.

The exchange point has potential for the future in fostering direct contact and cooperation between the two communities.

74. The number of Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island is now 544, of whom 541 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 3 in Kyrenia. The average age of these Greek Cypriots is now 66. UNFICYP continued to provide them with humanitarian support, delivering foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Government of Cyprus and the Cyprus Red Cross.

75. Over the past four years, Turkish Cypriot authorities have insisted on vetting school texts destined for Greek Cypriot schools in the Karpas, claiming that they contained material considered inaccurate and offensive to the Turkish Cypriots. Delivery of such books has thus been delayed and the schooling of the children concerned adversely affected.

76. UNFICYP continued to interview Greek Cypriots who applied for permanent transfer to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Four such transfers took place during the reporting period, and three Turkish Cypriots permanently transferred from south to north. UNFICYP also facilitated 476 visits by Greek Cypriots from the Karpas to the southern part of the island.

77. UNFICYP continued periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and assisted in arranging family reunion visits for Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace Hotel. Based on statistical evidence, it is apparent that Turkish Cypriot authorities gave preference to requests that originated in the north for family meetings and temporary transfers.

78. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 207. UNFICYP continued to help them to contact Maronites living elsewhere on the island and delivered to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

79. The mixed village of Pyla, located in the United Nations buffer zone, remained a matter of concern for UNFICYP during the reporting period. The following issues in Pyla have given rise to intercommunal differences:

(a) At present a Greek Cypriot sports complex is under construction in Pyla on a site immediately adjacent to the Turkish Cypriot school on formerly public land. It is viewed as insensitive and provocative to the Turkish Cypriot community and has been the subject of much complaint from that quarter. It is extremely regrettable that, in a village where both communities live locally in harmony, they do not share in the use and management of such sports and community facilities. This situation should be remedied;

(b) The allocation of Hali land in Pyla is a sensitive issue. Hali land is public land and is owned by the State. The State may grant public land (i.e. transfer ownership) to individuals or local communities upon application by them. Greek Cypriots have received allocations of Hali land over the years. The Turkish Cypriots of Pyla have yet to benefit and are awaiting a decision on their application for the allocation of a plot of Hali land on the plateau above Pyla village for a football field. In early November, the Government announced that it had decided to grant the Hali land for the football field to the Turkish Cypriot community. However, a number of applications from individual Turkish Cypriots for allocation of plots of public land, some submitted as long as two or three years ago, are still pending. A more equitable response from the Government to such applications is long overdue;

(c) Another provocation to the Turkish Cypriot community is the erection on 22 September 1993 of a very large Greek Cypriot sign above the Greek Cypriot coffee shop in the village square. This sign with its inscription displaying the Star of Vergina and the Greek flag clearly violates the status quo in Pyla and agreed UNFICYP procedures in respect of flags and emblems. Upon protest by UNFICYP, the Greek Cypriot side agreed to remove this sign. However, it has remained in place to date.

80. The Cyprus police control point on the Larnaca-Pyla road, south of the buffer zone, continued to block the flow of tourists and other visitors to Pyla, thus severely disrupting the village's economy. UNFICYP has on a continuing basis requested that this obstacle be removed.

81. UNFICYP pursued discussions with the two sides in order to expand direct telephone communications between Turkish Cypriot residents of Pyla and the north. For their part, Turkish Cypriot authorities had long before promised to facilitate at an early date telephone services to Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas and to Maronites living in the Kormakiti area. But that promise has not materialized. Neither side has been cooperative on this subject. UNFICYP continues to promote these important humanitarian projects.

82. UNFICYP has observed that political figures of both communities outside Pyla use Pyla for negative political purposes instead of fostering the already manifest capacity of the two communities that live there to exist together in a considerable measure of harmony. The result is not in the interests of the inhabitants of Pyla, nor is it in the interests of the two communities at large. I call on both sides not to undermine the desire in both communities in the village to be cooperative and positive in their dealings with one another and in resolving in a harmonious manner issues of mutual concern.

83. The attitude of the Turkish Cypriot authorities to contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is extremely restrictive. Freedom of movement is

frequently denied by them to Turkish Cypriots wishing to go to the Ledra Palace Hotel for contact with Greek Cypriots, and is granted to only a very few Turkish Cypriots wishing to cross to the southern part of the island for that purpose, and then only after much procrastination.

84. Once again, during the current mandate period, the Government of Cyprus has expressed to the United Nations its concern about continued changing of geographical and place names in the northern part of the island. The Government also stated that, in violation of the 1954 Hague Convention, the monastery of Apostolos Varnavas (Saint Barnabas) had been turned into a museum of antiquities displaying exhibits from approved private collections of Messrs. D. Hadjiprodromou and M. Zavos and from the stores of the Salamis archaeological site. Also, the Government stated that the church at the village of Livera had been turned into a mosque. These concerns were brought to the attention of the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

85. Also, during the current mandate period, the Government alleged to UNFICYP that a Greek Cypriot cemetery at Karavas in the northern part of the island had been desecrated. This matter was brought to the attention of the Turkish Cypriot authorities, who stated that the recent deterioration was due to neglect rather than vandalism and expressed a concern for the condition of the Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the southern part of the island.

C. Committee on Missing Persons

86. During the period under review the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held 4 sessions, consisting of a total of 13 meetings. The Committee continued its discussions on reports by both sides and its investigations in the cases that have been submitted to it so far.

87. The recent appointment by President Clerides of Mr. Leandros Zachariades as Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs should contribute positively to the Committee's work.

88. On 4 October 1993, I wrote once again to the leaders on both sides, noting with regret that since my review of the work of the Committee of 31 May 1992 (S/24050), there had been no improvement. To date, only 210 cases of missing persons have been submitted by the Greek Cypriot side and only 318 cases on the Turkish Cypriot side. I underlined to both leaders the need for both communities to demonstrate urgently their determination to support the work of the Committee. The international community and the United Nations, which had endorsed the objectives of the Committee and had funded a major portion of its work, would not understand if, nine years after it had become operational, the Committee remained unable to function effectively.

89. I emphasized to both leaders the need for a fresh commitment by both communities to the humanitarian objectives of the Committee. The communiqué issued by the Committee, on 11 April 1990, addressing the issues and difficulties that the Committee has faced, remains a good basis for a new start.

90. I told both leaders that I consider it vital that both communities commit themselves to the following:

(a) Both sides should submit to the Committee all their cases of missing persons without further delay. This would, inter alia, enable the Committee to take into consideration the common denominators linking certain cases or groups of cases to one another and would also allow the Committee to carry out its work in a more systematic manner and should help its members to reach a consensus on the overall criteria for taking decisions;

(b) The Committee should urgently reach a consensus on the criteria for concluding its investigations, taking into account the considerations in its communiqué of 11 April 1990.

91. The autonomy of the Committee and of its three members must be respected by all so that they can do their work without political interference and solely in the humanitarian interest of the families concerned. Outside interventions of a political character only undermine their work. The two Cypriot members of the Committee must receive the necessary support from their respective authorities.

92. In asking both leaders to support the approach set out above, I informed them that I had asked the Third Member to submit to me in January 1994 a full report on the situation at that time and that, on the basis of that report, I would review thoroughly the work of the Committee and evaluate how far it merits the continued support of the United Nations.

III. OBSERVATIONS

93. Since December 1990, the strength of UNFICYP has fallen from 2,132 to 1,203, a reduction of 43.6 per cent as the result of decisions by troop-contributing Governments to withdraw or substantially reduce their contingents. The Ferret Scout Car Squadron of 28 vehicles has been replaced by a smaller number of APCs. The Force now covers the cease-fire lines more thinly than before. Its capacity to react to incidents (on average 90 per month) and to prevent them from escalating has been affected. At the same time, the mandate of the Force has remained unchanged, as essentially have the functions deriving from that mandate.

94. The Force Commander has absorbed the effects of the successive reductions in the strength of the Force and has used his best endeavours to control the buffer zone, as well as to carry out UNFICYP's humanitarian functions. He has adjusted the organization of the Force by moving a greater proportion of battalion strengths into the buffer zone, reorganizing the system of observation posts, relying more heavily on mobile patrolling and beginning a process of handing over certain UNFICYP humanitarian activities to the two sides. Consequently, UNFICYP should be able to carry out its tasks, provided that the military on both sides maintain their present level of restraint and cooperation with the Force and provided that no major incidents occur.

95. The Security Council in its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993 asked me to address the question of possible progressive steps towards an observer force supported by three or four infantry companies, in line with the contents of paragraph 12 of my report of 30 March 1993 (S/25492).

96. The question of using large numbers of military observers in UNFICYP was addressed in a review of the Force carried out in 1990. The Force Commander and the Secretariat have again looked into this matter. They have concluded that a number of arguments continue to weigh heavily against the deployment of military observers.

97. If an unarmed observer mission is to be able to monitor a cease-fire and control a buffer zone, certain requirements must be fulfilled. There should be clear agreement between the parties on the delineation of the cease-fire lines and on rules about what is and is not permitted under the cease-fire. The cease-fire lines should be sufficiently far apart to reduce the risk of provocative actions leading to an unintended resumption of hostilities. The observers should have freedom of movement behind the cease-fire lines and should enjoy the full cooperation of the parties, including acceptance of their decisions in disputed cases. Above all, the situation must be one in which intervention and negotiation by unarmed military observers will suffice to control any local increase in tension, without a need for the United Nations to interpose itself physically between the two sides.

98. Those requirements are not at present fulfilled to the necessary extent in Cyprus. There is no clear agreement between the two sides on the delineation of all parts of the cease-fire lines or about what is permitted under the cease-fire. The cease-fire lines are in some places extremely close to each other. As part of its mandate, UNFICYP encourages the resumption of economic activity in the buffer zone, but because of the intense distrust between the two sides, this activity has to be carefully controlled by UNFICYP to ensure that it does not lead to incidents. These facts require UNFICYP not only to be able to observe incidents that could lead to a resumption of hostilities but also as a preventive measure to deploy, very rapidly, armed troops to occupy the ground between the two sides when an incident threatens to get out of control. I endorse the conclusion that these considerations rule out the option of turning UNFICYP into an observer mission.

99. The alternative option of dividing UNFICYP's functions between infantry and military observers was also examined. It was asked whether manpower savings could be made by retaining UNFICYP's infantry presence in the areas of greatest tension, especially Nicosia and its suburbs, but relying on United Nations military observers in at least some of the rural areas where incidents have been comparatively few. In such areas, the United Nations military observers would man observation posts and conduct mobile patrols and would call on Force headquarters to provide reinforcement if needed. This is in fact very close to what UNFICYP is doing at present. The difference is that the observation posts are manned by private soldiers and non-commissioned officers, who are able to deploy an armed patrol as soon as they observe an incident in their vicinity, whereas military observers would be unarmed and would not have that capacity. For all of these reasons, I do not recommend this option.

100. UNFICYP has recently been assigned a limited number (12) of military observers. These officers have been integrated into the existing three sectors and carry out reconnaissance, liaison and humanitarian tasks. Additionally, since they are on 1-year assignments while the infantry units are on six- to eight-month tours, the 12 military observers provide useful continuity from one line unit to its replacement. The Force Commander believes that in the present

circumstances and with the present configuration of the Force, the existing number of observers is sufficient to carry out these tasks. I have, nevertheless, instructed him to keep in mind the possibility of recommending the deployment of additional military observers if this would permit manpower savings without impairing the Force's operational effectiveness.

101. While UNFICYP has successfully kept the peace, the resulting opportunity has not been used properly by the two sides to reach an overall agreement. It is often asked whether UNFICYP is not part of the problem in Cyprus, rather than part of the solution. The ancillary question is how long UNFICYP will remain on the island. In weighing these questions, the Security Council might take into account, inter alia, the following considerations:

(a) Each side has its own perspective on the future of UNFICYP. The Greek Cypriot side perceives that, for as long as the current situation on the island remains unchanged, it has a vital interest, including for security reasons and mindful of the demographic changes that have taken place in the northern part of the island, in seeing UNFICYP maintained at its current or greater strength. The Turkish Cypriot side often says that it has no great objection to UNFICYP remaining on the island, but nor does it particularly desire its continued presence, as security and stability on the island are assured by the large-scale presence of Turkish forces;

(b) There can be no doubt that, were UNFICYP to be withdrawn, the present buffer zone, which makes up 3 per cent of the island, would be a vacuum that each side would want to fill, at least in part. This, combined with the very close proximity of the cease-fire lines in certain sensitive locations, would give rise to incidents which, without the presence of UNFICYP, would quickly escalate out of control and could result in a conflict, with significant consequences for the security of both communities, and indeed of the region. This would also eliminate any hope of progress in my mission of good offices;

(c) The status quo, which the Security Council has deemed to be unacceptable, was established through the use of force and is sustained by military strength. Such a status quo is not viable in the long term. A negotiated settlement, mutually acceptable to the two communities in Cyprus, is needed. The maintenance of tranquillity between the cease-fire lines is a necessary condition for this to be achieved.

102. There is every justification for demanding that the two sides on the island, as well as Turkey and Greece, work more effectively for a negotiated settlement, in return for the great efforts of the international community. The responsibilities of the two sides include the following elements in particular:

(a) They must show a serious willingness to compromise. A permanent focus on the past condemns Cyprus to a bleak future. They must have the courage and imagination to envisage and bring about the better Cyprus that is on offer. No solution worth having, indeed no agreed solution of any kind, is possible without a measure of domestic political cost to the leadership on each side;

(b) Both sides must work more effectively to promote tolerance and reconciliation. Both have been wanting in this respect. Neither teaches the other's language in its schools. The Turkish Cypriot authorities actively

discourage and frequently prevent members of their community from having contacts and dealings with Greek Cypriots. Bicommunal programmes, for example those of UNHCR and others, have to expend great and unnecessary energy in trying to overcome this impediment;

(c) On the Greek Cypriot side, there is a widespread reluctance to have anything to do with the Turkish Cypriot side in current circumstances. Recently, for example, a small number of private Greek Cypriot participants in a worthy bicommunal endeavour to foster fresh and practical thinking were made the victims of a campaign of questioning and vilification in the Greek Cypriot press, a campaign that can only be described as paranoid and in which a great proportion of the Greek Cypriot political establishment joined;

(d) Simultaneously, the two sides, despite their professed aim of forging an agreed settlement and creating a bicommunal and bizonal federation, carry out an endless propaganda campaign against each other that is incompatible with this objective. Even school textbooks are not exempt from that campaign. This must change.

103. I intend to concentrate on the package of confidence-building measures for the immediate future. The package is a good one and would confer important and proportionate benefits on both sides. This effort is intended to facilitate an overall framework agreement based on the set of ideas and is not a substitute for that agreement.

104. After the elections in the Turkish Cypriot community on 12 December, I shall resume intensive contacts with both sides and with Turkey. It is expected that the Government of Turkey's declared support of the package and its assurances that speedy developments may be expected will bring positive results. It is also essential that the Greek Cypriot side demonstrate its readiness to take the specific steps called for in the package. I propose to report further to the Security Council on the outcome of my efforts by the end of February 1994.

105. In the meantime, I would urge once again that as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops envisaged in the set of ideas, the Turkish forces on the island be reduced to their level of 1982 and this be reciprocated by a suspension of weapons acquisition programmes on the Greek Cypriot side.

106. Furthermore, I call upon the military on both sides to cooperate with UNFICYP in extending the 1989 unmanning agreement so that it will cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other. Unmanning these positions would significantly reduce the tensions in the buffer zone and facilitate UNFICYP's tasks.

107. I also urge the military authorities on both sides, and especially the Turkish Forces, in line with Security Council resolution 839 (1993), to enter into mutual commitments to prohibit along the cease-fire line live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone.

108. In the prevailing circumstances, I recommend that the Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period until 15 June 1994. In

accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

109. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the support that they have given to this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force and pledges towards its financing in the future.

110. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark, to my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel, to the Force Commander, Major-General Michael Minehane, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP, who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980, document S/14275 and note 57.

2/ Ibid., Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1979, document S/13369, para. 12.

3/ See A/47/1001.

4/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1964, document A/5634 and Corr.1, annex.

5/ See Ibid., Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985, document S/17657, para. 19.

COMPARISON OF COSTS OF UNFICYP 1985-1993

Budgeted costs per six-month mandate
US Dollars (millions)



Figures Exclude Costs Absorbed by Troop Contributors

(a)Swedish Battalion withdrew Dec 1987
(b)Strength Reduced by 580 (see S/24817)
(c)June-Dec1993 - Appropriation

Annex II

Voluntary contributions: cash and pledges from inception to 15 June 1993

(In United States dollars)

Country	27 March 1964-15 June 1993
Antigua and Barbuda	500
Australia	3 619 879
Austria	6 190 000
Bahamas	18 500
Barbados	8 500
Belgium	6 518 517
Botswana	500
Brunei Darussalam	14 000
Cameroon	28 853
Cyprus	11 256 359
Cambodia	600
Denmark	6 589 328
France	517 927
Finland	1 050 000
Germany	35 342 346
Ghana	76 897
Greece	27 620 311
Guyana	12 816
Iceland	196 701
India	120 000
Indonesia	15 000
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	94 500
Iraq	50 000
Ireland	50 000
Israel	26 500
Italy	11 297 030
Côte d'Ivoire	60 000
Jamaica	36 783
Japan	8 040 000
Jordan	2 000
Kuwait	165 000
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 500
Lebanon	5 194
Liberia	11 821
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	50 000
Liechtenstein	2 000

Country	27 March 1964-15 June 1993
Luxembourg	242 246
Malawi	6 363
Malaysia	17 500
Malta	9 622
Mauritania	4 370
Micronesia (Federated States of)	300
Morocco	20 000
Nepal	2 400
Netherlands	2 518 425
New Zealand	71 137
Niger	2 041
Nigeria	48 070
Norway	13 798 275
Oman	8 000
Pakistan	77 791
Panama	2 000
Philippines	16 443
Portugal	12 000
Qatar	21 000
Republic of Korea	16 000
Sierra Leone	46 425
Singapore	9 000
Somalia	1 000
Spain	923 237
Sri Lanka	4 000
Sweden	8 645 000
Switzerland	18 882 373
Thailand	10 500
Togo	12 209
Trinidad and Tobago	2 400
Tunisia	3 000
Turkey	1 839 253
United Arab Emirates	30 000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	89 191 363
United Republic of Tanzania	7 000
United States of America	234 306 092
Uruguay	14 000
Venezuela	72 982
Viet Nam	4 000
Yugoslavia	140 000

Country	27 March 1964-15 June 1993
Zaire	36 000
Zambia	45 379
Zimbabwe	24 918
Total	490 233 975


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود المقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场，简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
HQ UNFICYP
HQ BRITCON
UN MP Element
Army Air Corps Flight
Supply Det
Perm Force Res Pl
One Coy
IRCIVPOL Stn
Liaison Post
HQ SECTOR 1
(ARGCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
AUSTCIVPOL Stn
Support Coy
One Coy
One Coy
One Coy
KYRENIA
SECTOR 1
One Pl
NICOSIA
SECTOR 2
Support Element
HQ SECTOR 4
(AUSCON)
HQ Coy
IRCIVPOL Stn
FAMAGUSTA
Liaison Post
One Coy
SECTOR 4
LARNACA
IRCIVPOL Stn
PAPHOS
LIMASSOL
HQ SECTOR 2
(BRITCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
AUSTCIVPOL Stn
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 33 UNITED NATIONS
NOVEMBER 1993
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لحفظ السلم في قبرص في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر ١٩٩٣
1993年11月的联塞部队部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF NOVEMBER 1993
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1993
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА НОЯБРЬ 1993
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN NOVIEMBRE DE 1993
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Lineas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Lineas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza